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Abstract
How do people solve the explore-exploit trade-off in a chang-
ing environment? In this paper we present experimental evi-
dence in an “observe or bet” task, comparing human behavior
in a changing environment to their behavior in an unchanging
one. We present a Bayesian analysis of the observe or bet task
and show that human judgments are consistent with that analy-
sis. However, we find that people’s behavior is most consistent
with a Bayesian model that assumes a rate of change that is
higher than the true rate in the task. We argue that this ten-
dency is the result of asymmetric consequences: assuming that
the world changes more often than it really does is not very
costly, whereas assuming a too-low rate of change can carry
much more severe consequences.
Keywords: decision making; explore-exploit dilemmas;
learning; change detection
Introduction
“When one thinks about designing intelligent agents, it
quickly becomes obvious that the task environment in
which the agent will operate is a primary determiner of
the appropriate design” – Jordan and Russell (1999, pp.
lxxv)
“Outside of gambling casinos and psychology laborato-
ries, there are few – if any – circumstances where one
can safely assume conditional independence of a suc-
cession of events” – Ayton and Fischer (2004, pp. 1369)
Consider the problem facing someone who wants to make
her first investments on the stock market. Initially she knows
very little about what stocks to buy, and so must spend time
learning about the market before making a purchase. Once
the investments are made, external constraints (e.g., work,
family) mean that she cannot afford to spend a lot of time
monitoring investments: once the purchase is made, she is
more or less required to ignore low level details of how the
investments are performing most of the time. Occasionally,
when she has time to re-evaluate her portfolio, she might look
at the market in more detail to determine whether to change
her investments. Given this, how much time should she spend
researching her initial investment? How often should she re-
visit her portfolio to consider making changes? When she
does so, how much time should she spend revisiting her orig-
inal decisions?
The stock market scenario is an example of an explore-
exploit problem. The actor is operating in an environment that
can generate rewards (money) from different options (pur-
chases), but is initially uncertain about which options are
good and which are bad. To maximize rewards, some propor-
tion of the actor’s time must be spent obtaining information
about the structure of the environment (“exploration”), and
some proportion on using this knowledge to extract rewards
(“exploitation”).
Explore-exploit problems have been studied a lot in psy-
chology (see Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007). In this paper we
focus on the “observe or bet” task (Tversky & Edwards, 1966;
Rakow, Newell, & Zougkou, 2010). Like the better known
bandit problem (Robbins, 1952; Steyvers, Lee, & Wagen-
makers, 2009), the observe or bet task provides an elegant ex-
perimental framework within which to study explore-exploit
dilemmas, and can be viewed as a highly simplified version
of the stock market scenario. The decision maker has a num-
ber of options available (stocks), each of which may yield
rewards (or losses). On each trial, she may choose to observe
the state of the world (i.e. do research), in which case she gets
to see what rewards each option provided, but receives no re-
ward nor suffers any losses. Alternatively she may pick one
of the options and receive the rewards/losses associated with
that option at the end of the task. However, when she does she
receives no information at that time: the outcomes are hidden
from her. Although a little unrealistic, the design is qualita-
tively in keeping with the constraints posed by the real world
problem and the design of the task creates a clean separation
between information gathering (observe) and reward taking
(bet).
The focus of the paper is on how people make the re-
quired trade-off in a changing environment. Much of the lit-
erature focuses on problems in which the underlying struc-
ture of the learning problem is static (Shanks, Tunney, &
McCarthy, 2002), presumably because the inference problem
is simpler. Yet, as discussed by Ayton and Fischer (2004),
the actual environments in which people have to operate are
not static: things change. Strategies that are optimal in an
unchanging world may be highly maladaptive in a dynamic
world. If people are accustomed to making choices in a dy-
namic environment and use strategies that are appropriate
to such an environment, studying their behavior using static
tasks may be highly misleading. In addition to its relevance
to explore-exploit problems (Cohen et al., 2007), this idea
has been discussed in connection with classic decision mak-
ing biases (Ayton & Fischer, 2004), sequential effects, (Yu &
Cohen, 2008) and categorization (Navarro, Perfors, & Vong,
2013). In an explore-exploit context, people show sensitiv-
ity to changing reward probabilities in bandit tasks (Daw,
O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006).
Rational choice in the observe or bet task
Consider the simplest version of an observe or bet task. There
are only two outcomes (e.g., “pick blue” or “pick red”), and
on every trial one option provides a reward and the other pro-
vides a loss. The learner’s goal is to use observations to deter-
mine which option is more likely to be the reward-generating
one, and bet on that option. If the reward probabilities do
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(a) Static world, static model. Score = 29

























(b) Static world, dynamic model. Score = 21

























(c) Dynamic world, static model. Score = −11

























(d) Dynamic world, dynamic model. Score = 15
Figure 1: Model performance in a static world (panels a and b) and a dynamic one (panels c and d). The actual outcomes used correspond to
the static and dynamic conditions in game 2, version 3 of the experiment (see Figure 2). In all cases the model requires a confidence of 75%
in order to make a bet. Model performance is shown for an assumed change rate of 0% (panels a and c) and 5% (panels b and d). See main
text for details.
not change over time, there is a well-known optimal strategy
to solve the task, and previous studies have shown that peo-
ple rarely follow it (Tversky & Edwards, 1966; Rakow et al.,
2010). However, the analysis is not applicable to situations
where the probabilities of different outcomes can change, or
where the learner is uncertain about whether the environment
is truly static. In this section we outline a new analysis of
the observe or bet task that is more appropriate to a chang-
ing world. The analysis retains the core features of the origi-
nal analysis, but uses the “dynamic belief” framework (Yu &
Cohen, 2008) to allow the learner to respond appropriately to
changes in the world.
The static task
The rational analysis presented by Tversky and Edwards
(1966) is based on the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT:
Wald, 1947), and is closely related to standard psychologi-
cal models of choice reaction time experiments (e.g., Ratcliff,
1978). The SPRT describes the behavior of a rational learner
who needs to choose between two hypotheses about data that
arrive over time, using as few observations as possible. In the
binary observe or bet task, the key variable to be inferred is
θ, the probability that (say) “blue” will be the reward giving
option. Let xi denote the observations that the learner makes
on trial i, where xi = 1 means that the learner has observed a
blue light, xi =−1 means that the learner has observed a red
light, and xi = 0 means that the learner has not observed any-
thing on this trial. The complete set of data available to the
learner on trial t corresponds to the vector xt = (x1,x2, . . . ,xt).
Using Bayes’ rule we see that the posterior distribution over






where P(θ) denotes the learner’s prior over the bias1 and
P(xi|θ) =
 θ if xi = 11 if xi = 01−θ if xi =−1 (2)
1We fixed this to be a Beta(5,5) distribution.
Of course, the primary goal in the task is not to infer the spe-
cific value of θ, but to determine which option to bet on. That
is, the learner needs to infer whether θ > .5 or θ < .5. The
relevant probability is




The SPRT strategy is essentially equivalent to this
Bayesian analysis, in which the decision-maker specifies an
allowable tolerance ε for making incorrect decisions.2 Ini-
tially, the learner does not know which option is best, and
so it starts by making observations, and updating his or her
beliefs about the relative goodness of different options via
Bayes’ rule. Once the posterior probability of one of the two
choices exceeds the required evidentiary standard (i.e., poste-
rior probability exceeds 1− ε), it then chooses that option on
the next trial and for all future trials. It never makes new
observations because it has absolute faith that nothing can
change: if guessing “blue” was the right thing to do on trial
5, it will remain the right thing to do for all subsequent trials.
Adapting to change
What happens to this strategy if the world can change? As
before, the model has a fixed tolerance for errors ε. It will
choose a particular option on trial t only if the posterior prob-
ability that it is the correct choice exceeds 1− ε, and will
observe if no option reaches this threshold. When the world
can change, the correct choice on (say) trial 5 may not be the
correct choice on trial 50, and so the confidence in a chosen
option will decrease over time if the model does not continue
to receive confirming evidence.
The difficulty for the learner is that he or she can never
be certain if a change has occurred. In the dynamic observe
or bet task, just as in real life, changes can occur without
warning: it is only by continuing to make observations and
2The SPRT approach remains agnostic about how ε should be
set. It is possible to be more precise about the optimal strategy by
treating the task as a partially observable Markov decision policy, an
approach that has been used in related problems (e.g. Frazier & Yu,
2007; Zhang & Yu, 2013). To keep things simple, we forbear from
introducing this additional complexity in this initial investigation.
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comparing those observations to your expectations that you
can infer that a change has happened. The observe or bet
task is particularly difficult in this respect, because the learner
is required to explicitly decide to give up a potential reward
every time he or she wants to “check” that his or her betting
strategy is still effective.
To formalize this intuition, we follow previous work (Yu
& Cohen, 2008; Brown & Steyvers, 2009) and use a simple
change model: the model assumes that on every trial there is
some probability α that the world changes in an entirely ar-
bitrary way. To incorporate this idea into the model the key
observation is that in a static world, “today’s priors are yes-
terday’s posteriors”. That is, the Bayesian posterior at time t
in Equation 1 could equally have been described in terms of
the posterior at time t−1, like so:
P(θ|xt) ∝ P(xt |θ)P(θ|xt−1) (4)
However, when things can change, this relationship no longer
holds. If we let θt denote the probability that blue is the right
choice on trial t, then the corresponding equation becomes
P(θt |xt) ∝ P(xt |θt)
∫ 1
0
P(θt |θt−1)P(θt−1|xt−1) dθt−1 (5)
where the term P(θt |θt−1) describes the dynamics of the
world: that is, it describes the conditional distribution over
the true probability at time t (i.e., θt ) given that the true prob-
ability on the previous trial was θt−1. Specifically, with prob-
ability α there is no change and θt is thus identical to θt−1,
but with probability α it changes unpredictably, and so the
learner must assume that θt is a random sample from the prior
distribution P(θ).
The resulting model turns out to be very tractable when
particle filtering is used to compute posterior distributions
over θ at every trial (Doucet, De Freitas, & Gordon, 2001; see
Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010 for psychological appli-
cations). From these posterior distributions it is straightfor-
ward to infer when the model observes and when it bets.3
Illustrating model behavior
The behavior of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. Each
plot shows the model’s confidence (i.e., posterior probabil-
ity that θ > .5) on every trial. The markers indicate whether
the model observed a blue light (black circle), or a red light
(white circle), or whether the model chose to bet on that trial
(crosses). If the model assumes that θ does not change over
time (i.e. α = 0, panels a and c), the model continues to
make observations until some required degree of confidence
is reached (dashed lines), at which point it begins to bet and
continues to do so until the end of the game. When the model
believes that θ can change over time (α = .05, panels b and
d), the behavior is quite different. As before, it observes for
a time at the beginning of the task, at which point it begins
3R code implementing the model using particle filtering is avail-
able at https://bitbucket.org/dannavarro/observe-or-bet
to bet. However, because the model receives no information
from a bet, the probability that an unobserved change has oc-
curred rises, causing its confidence to decrease. Eventually,
the confidence falls below threshold and it makes another ob-
servation. If the world has changed the model may detect it
and change its betting strategy: this happens in panel d. The
figure shows how well the model performs in different con-
ditions if a point is earned for every correct guess, and one
is lost for every incorrect guess. The dynamic model per-
forms reasonably well if the world is static (21 points) or if
it changes (15 points). The static model performs well when
the world is static (29 points), but performs very poorly when
the world can change (-11 points).
Experiment
Previous research suggests that human behavior in static ob-
serve or bet tasks does not mirror the static version of the
model, but has some similarity to the dynamic version (see
Tversky & Edwards, 1966; Rakow et al., 2010): even when
the world is static, people have a tendency to keep checking,
just to make sure that the strategy they are following is still
correct. The analysis presented above suggests that there may
be a good reason for this: the consequences of incorrectly as-
suming the world is static appear to be more severe than those
for incorrectly assuming that it is not. In this experiment we
explore this idea, and use the model to infer how changeable
people expect the task to be.
Method
Participants A total of 108 US-based workers (46 female)
on Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in the experiment,
randomly assigned to conditions. The task took about 10 min-
utes to complete and workers were paid US$0.60 for their
time. Mean reported age was 34.9 (std dev = 11.7).
Materials & Procedure The task took the form of a guess-
ing game, in which participants were told about “blox ma-
chines”, which are devices that have two lights (blue and red).
On every trial, one of the two lights would turn on, and the
task was to predict which one it would be. The cover story ex-
plained that every blox machine has a bias to prefer one light
or the other, but that their behavior was otherwise arbitrary. In
the dynamic condition, participants were also told that some-
times the bias on a blox machine could randomly change, and
that although such changes were rare they should expect to
encounter a few of them during the experiment. The bias was
always of the same magnitude (a 70:30 split), but participants
were not informed of this.
The structure of the observe or bet task was then explained:
on any given trial they could either choose to see what color
light turned on (but receive no points), or they could guess a
color. If they guessed, they would not be shown what actu-
ally happened. Nevertheless, they were told that they would
receive one point for every correct guess, and lose one point
for every incorrect guess.






































Figure 2: Outcome sequences used in one version of the experiment (version 3 only). Each sequence is shown as a random walk: every time
the machine turns on the blue light (whether observed by the participant or not), the walk takes a step up, and every time it turns red the walk
takes a step down. The sequences for the static condition are shown as the grey lines, and always have a consistent bias in one direction or
the other. The dynamic sequences are initially identical to the corresponding static sequences. After a change occurs (circles) the dynamic
sequences have the opposite outcomes to the corresponding static ones (black lines). Note that in game 5, the dynamic sequence did not have
a change point, so the two conditions used identical data in this case. This also happened in version 1 game 1 and version 2 game 3.
a new blox machine) consisting of 50 trials, and at the end of
each game received detailed feedback that showed what they
did on every trial and what the machine did on every trial. It
showed which trials they won points for and which they lost
points for, as well as giving them a final score.
There were three versions of each condition, each with a
fixed set of outcomes (see Figure 2). In all three versions, the
dynamic condition involved a change in 4 of the 5 games, but
in one game the dynamic and static outcomes were identical.
By doing so, it was tested whether expectations about change
affect people’s behavior independently of whether any actual
change occurs.
Results
The main variable of interest is how often people choose to
observe rather than bet, and critically, when they choose to do
so.4 With this in mind, Figure 3a plots the proportion of trials
on which participants chose to observe rather than bet, shown
as a function of trial block, condition, and game number. In
both the static and dynamic conditions there is a tendency,
across all five games, for people to observe the most at the
beginning of the game, and least towards the end. As pre-
dicted, this effect is more pronounced for the static condition
than the dynamic condition.
To quantify this effect, it is useful to analyze the data
from the first 10 trials (block 1) of each game separately
from the other trials. For block 1, we fit a linear mixed ef-
fects model that included fixed effects of condition and game.
For the remaining data, we fit a separate mixed model with
fixed effects of condition, game and block. In both cases
individual differences were captured with a random inter-
cept term. During block 1, participants in the stationary
condition were significantly more likely to observe than the
participants in the dynamic condition (analysis of deviance:
4The betting strategies people followed are also interesting: peo-
ple sometimes probability match rather than select the best option
given their observations. However, space constraints prevent us from
discussing this aspect of the data set.
χ2(1) = 5.00, p = .025), whereas in blocks 2 to 5 they were
less likely to do so (χ2(1) = 9.24, p = .002). The amount of
observation in block 1 did not change as a function of game
(χ2(1) = .005, p = .94), but for the later blocks people were
less likely to observe in the later games (χ2(1) = 52.3, p <
.001). It is obvious from inspection of the plots that people
were more likely to observe during block 1 than later blocks:
additionally, the statistical analysis confirmed that the smaller
trend towards less observation from blocks 2 to 5 is also sig-
nificant (χ2(1) = 75.5, p< .001).
One possibility to consider is that, although the pattern of
responses in Figure 3a appear quite different, it might be that
people are following the same strategy in both conditions.
Any differences in the data might be caused by incidental
differences in the sequences, and not due to any inferences
people are making about the changing nature of the environ-
ment. Our design lets us test this directly, since there are three
cases when the sequences are identical for the two conditions:
game 1 in version 1, game 3 in version 2, and game 5 in ver-
sion 3 (see Figure 2).
The data for those cases are plotted in Figure 4. There
are no differences in responses on game 1 (version 1), imply-
ing that the cover story manipulation alone had no effect on
people’s behavior. The differences in behavior on game 1 in
Figure 3a are driven by people adapting to the changes that
actually do occur on game 1 for versions 2 and 3. In contrast,
by the time people play games 3 and 5, there are genuine dif-
ferences in performance even when the actual sequences are
identical. Previous experience with changing (or static) envi-
ronments has altered the approach that people take.
Modelling the observe or bet data
Model fitting was done by grid search over evidence thresh-
olds and change rates, minimizing the sum squared error
across the five blocks. The model was fit separately to each
subject and each game. The average model behavior is plot-
ted in Figure 3b. Across all blocks, games and conditions
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Figure 3: (a) Proportion of trials on which participants chose to observe rather than bet, shown as a function of trial block, condition, and
game number. Each block consists of 10 trials. Error bars plot 95% confidence intervals. (b) Model behavior when fit to the human data.
r = .97 (p < .001). The correlation between model predic-
tions and human data was significant in 97 of 108 cases, with
an average correlation of r = .83.5
The parameter estimates are shown in Figure 5, and reveal
two interesting facts. Firstly, the best fitting change rate pa-
rameters were higher in the dynamic condition than the static
condition, as one would expect. The model fits imply that
people in the dynamic condition were behaving (on average)
as if they expected changes to occur on 7.5% of the trials,
whereas in the static condition they behaved as if changes
were expected 3.5% of the time. In both cases, the true rate of
change was substantially lower than these estimates suggest.
In the static condition, the true change rate was obviously 0%.
In the dynamic condition, there were 4 change trials among
the 250 trials each participant played, so the true change rate
was only 1.6%. Both are much lower than the implied change
rates that emerge from the model fitting.
Secondly, the evidence thresholds were higher in the sta-
tionary condition than in the dynamic condition: the model
fits imply that in the stationary condition, an option needed
to have a 71% chance of being correct in order for people to
be willing to bet, whereas in the dynamic condition this falls
to 63%. This may not be arbitrary: if the world can change,
5Note that the model uses 10 parameters to fit the 25 blocks of
data provided by each person, so the very good fits are only mod-
erately strong evidence. We used this non-parsimonious version of
the model because we wanted separate parameter estimates for each
game (see Figure 5).
it may make sense to act quickly (with less evidence) to take
rewards before it does change.
Discussion
Why study human behavior in changing environments? As a
discipline we find it difficult enough to provide clear theoret-
ical accounts of how people behave on static problems. Mak-
ing the task more complex and dynamic might appear to be a
recipe for disaster. The problem, as we see it, is that human
cognition is adapted (either via evolution or prior learning)
to operate in changing and responsive worlds. This matters:
as noted by (Jordan & Russell, 1999), the structure of the
operating environment imposes strong constraints on how an
intelligent agent can be built. This basic idea underpins both
the “fast and frugal heuristics” literature (e.g. Simon, 1956;
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009) as well as the “rational anal-
ysis” approach to building cognitive models (e.g. Anderson,
1990). Viewed from this perspective, studying human cogni-
tion in an unchanging world is like studying the aerodynamic
properties of an octopus: technically possible, because water
and air are both fluids, but frustrating and misleading because
it ignores what the organism is designed to achieve.
The observe or bet task is an instructive case. As illustrated
by Figure 1, the “rational” strategy discussed by Tversky and
Edwards (1966) turns out to be limited and very fragile. A
learner who incorrectly assumes that the world is changeable







































Figure 4: Proportion of trials observed broken down by trial block,
for the three test cases. Sequence 1 in version 1 happened to be
identical (and unchanging) in both conditions, as was sequence 3 in
version 2 and sequence 5 in version 3. There appears to be no “pure”
cover story effect, insofar as the responses on game 1 are the same in
both conditions. In later games, however, an effect is observed that
is qualitatively identical to the one shown in Figure 3. Given that
the sequences are identical, this difference implies that the observed
effect is a genuine strategy shift between conditions, and not merely
the application of a single strategy that produces different results
when given different data.



































Figure 5: Estimated model parameters by condition and game. In
the dynamic condition the subjective change rates are higher, and
the evidence thresholds are lower.
form slightly worse in psychology experiments, and perhaps
runs the risk of being called “irrational” by the researchers.
On the other hand, a learner who incorrectly assumes that the
world is static can perform catastrophically badly when the
world changes.
This asymmetry has consequences for our data. When we
fit the model to human data, we found that people act as if
they expected a lot more changes than actually occurred. In
the static condition (true change rate 0%) people expected a
change rate of 3.5%. In the dynamic condition (true change
rate 1.6%) people appeared to expect a change rate of 7.5%.
Viewed narrowly, we might conclude that people are miscal-
ibrated in their assessment of how to solve explore-exploit
problems in changing environments. A more charitable inter-
pretation would be to note that people can never know with
certainty what the rate of change might be (even if we were to
tell them: experimenters lie), and that one error is worse than
the other. If underestimating the rate of change is a vastly
more dangerous mistake than overestimating it, then an intel-
ligent decision maker should err on the side of caution and
act as if the rate of change is much higher than it actually is.
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